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CONDITIONAL SURRENDER
Conflict Termination in the Pacific, 1945
Richard J. Shuster and Takuya Shimodaira
Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate col-
lapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to 
the total extinction of human civilization.
EMPEROR HIROHITO, 15 AUGUST 1945
 With the statement above, Emperor Hirohito announced to his people that Japan had accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, bringing to 
an end the savage fighting in the Pacific. Two weeks later aboard the battleship 
USS Missouri, as General Douglas MacArthur, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and 
a host of other senior Allied leaders looked on stoically, the Japanese military 
and civilian leadership signed the Instrument of Surrender officially terminating 
hostilities. The three and a half years of fighting between the United States and 
Japan had been particularly ruthless and bloody, with an estimated 110,000 U.S. 
military personnel killed in the Pacific theater. Casualty figures for Japan were 
staggering, with over two million military personnel and civilians killed, while 
entire sections of major Japanese cities had been reduced to ashes.1
Although the United States remained focused throughout the war on planning 
and executing campaigns and operations to defeat both Germany and Japan, it 
also spent critical time planning how best to terminate the conflict—on terms 
favorable to American interests. Although by August 1945 the United States had 
established military ascendancy, casualties had continued to mount with each 
successive operation. The unprecedentedly grim numbers of casualties for com-
batants and civilians combined that were projected for an invasion of Japan easily 
would surpass those of previous campaigns, so it was essential to avoid them if at 
all possible. Furthermore, Allied statesmen hoped that all the war’s military and 
civilian casualties would not have been in vain but would lead to a postwar world 
free of German and Japanese militarism, and authoritarianism in general. How 
and why this global conflict reached its conclusion in the Pacific as it did, and the 
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nature of that conclusion as seen from the perspective of both the United States 
and Japan, will be the subject of this article.
This study focuses on the military aspects of conflict termination but does not 
ignore the higher-level, political influence on terminating military operations. In 
general, a combatant seeks to terminate hostilities so as to make peace on terms 
that are aligned with its national interests over the long term. In the Pacific in 
1945, the question of the future of the emperor was a key facet of both military 
and political aspects of termination; agreeing to a compromise of unconditional 
surrender that allowed continuation of a role for the emperor influenced Japan’s 
decision to surrender and helped set conditions for the longer-term development 
of democracy in Japan, as well as the stability of U.S.-Japanese relations.
Conflict termination is the formal end of major combat operations.2 The pro-
cess of terminating a conflict can be more difficult than initiating combat actions. 
Often civilian and military leaders must address numerous complex challenges 
if they are to terminate conflict and create conditions conducive to successful 
postconflict operations. In other words, starting a war is much easier than end-
ing one.3 How the critical transition from high-intensity conflict to termination 
of hostilities and then to postconflict operations is accomplished has a direct 
impact on whether operational victory can be transformed into strategic success. 
Consequently, political and military leaders face key planning considerations in 
terminating conflict.
The challenge of conflict termination is not simply to accomplish the dis-
continuation of hostilities at any particular point in time but to transition from 
combat to postconflict operations effectively. In essence, successful conflict ter-
mination should set the conditions for successful stability operations and lead 
directly to the achievement of the strategic objective. Normally, the strategic 
leadership of the victorious side in a conflict sets the terms and conditions of 
termination, but—as with everything else in war—the enemy certainly has a 
role. The cessation of hostilities cannot be a unilateral process, as ultimately the 
losing side decides when to terminate conflict. In World War II, both Germany 
and Japan continued to fight long after any reasonable expectation of attaining 
their objectives had vanished. In short, conflict termination can be a disorderly 
process. Setting the stage for a continued military and civilian presence after the 
termination of major combat operations is critical to any long-term success in a 
region. In other words, theater- and operational-level planning should not focus 
on ending hostilities at the expense of what comes next.
Despite the combatants’ strategic and operational focus on achieving military 
victory, the process of considering how to terminate the U.S.-Japanese conflict in 
the Pacific did not begin in 1945 but as early as mid-1943, after the United States 
had assaulted Saipan, Guam, and Tinian in the Mariana Islands. Notwithstanding 
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the intense fighting between the combatants up to that point, with even larger and 
more-costly operations to follow, the strategic political and military leadership 
on both sides began to see the inevitability of a U.S. victory over Japan. Conse-
quently, each combatant began to study how to bring the war to an end on terms 
favorable to its own national interests. The United States pushed relentlessly for 
unconditional surrender, while Japan sought to force a negotiated settlement.
In planning for the termination of hostilities and the transition to postconflict 
operations, U.S. strategic planners feared the worst: revenge, retaliation, and in-
surgency.4 Fighting in the Pacific was particularly brutal, perhaps matched in its 
utter ruthlessness and racial overtones only by the four years of carnage between 
Germany and the Soviet Union. Yet the outcome of Japan’s defeat ended up hav-
ing a much different postscript: a peaceful transition to a new world order and 
the development of strong relations between the former enemies.
An examination of conflict termination in the Pacific in 1945 reveals three 
major themes: (1) its shaping by America’s relentless offensive operations aimed 
at defeating Japanese military power and obtaining political leverage; (2) a 
comprehensive U.S. understanding of the operational environment that helped 
frame detailed planning and termination criteria; and (3) the Japanese emperor’s 
ultimate embrace of the peace faction, upon realizing the futility of continued 
fighting. In the end, the victory came about through a conditional surrender that 
set the conditions for a smooth transition to postwar stability in Japan.
EFFECTIVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION, 1943–45:  
THE RELENTLESS PUSH TO THE END
The essence of conflict termination is “political leverage borne of battlefield suc-
cess,” and the Pacific theater in World War II provides the perfect illustration of 
this truth.5 The United States, after declaring that it sought nothing less than the 
unconditional surrender of Japan (and Germany), dedicated its offensive capabil-
ities to destroying the Japanese armed forces to a point at which the United States 
could enforce its will over the defeated nation. For its part, Japan aimed to inflict 
high casualties on U.S. forces to precipitate a conditional peace. Consequently, 
even after the final outcome became obvious to all, Allied offensive operations 
and strikes continued—right up until the final seconds of the war. In fact, both 
sides’ continued fierce fighting in ongoing operations and their planning of fu-
ture operations for the remainder of 1945 and beyond were characterized by an 
acceptance of the likelihood of staggering casualties, to position themselves bet-
ter to support their national interests.
Although the United States had stated clearly its strategic priority in the overall 
war effort as the defeat of Germany, it never lost sight of the ultimate strategic ob-
jective in the Pacific: the defeat of Japan. Only destruction of the Japanese armed 
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forces could prevent Japanese aggression in the Pacific and restore U.S. national 
interests in the region. From President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s initial December 
1941 call for “absolute victory” to the more comprehensive January 1943 decla-
ration of the goal of “unconditional surrender,” the United States transitioned 
from an initial strategic defensive into an all-out offensive to destroy Japan’s war-
making capability and enforce its will on a defeated enemy.
At a higher level, America’s desired end state is more difficult to determine 
than the concise declaration of “unconditional surrender” communicates. Dis-
cernible from the war aims listed in the Cairo Declaration of November 1943 
and other strategic-level policy statements, the desired end state of the Allies 
amounted to the restoration of Japanese-occupied territories, the creation of 
conditions that would prevent Japanese aggression against peace and security, 
and the emergence in Japan of a government that respected the international 
world order.6 
By the start of 1943, the tide of war in the Pacific had turned decidedly in 
favor of the United States. American forces had halted Japanese advances in New 
Guinea and extended their own lines of operation along its coast, while gaining a 
critical base of operations on Guadalcanal. Toward the end of January 1943, at the 
Casablanca Conference, President Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston 
S. Churchill agreed that the Allies would seek a more definitive strategic objective 
in both Europe and the Pacific: the unconditional surrender of both Germany 
and Japan. The two leaders were determined to bring peace “to the world only 
by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power,” with “the simple for-
mula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an unconditional surrender 
by Germany, Italy, and Japan.” Instead of destroying the “populace” of the enemy 
nations, they advocated destroying the “philosophy” that was based on “conquest 
and subjugation.”7 In other words, the strategic objective had two major elements, 
military and political, that amounted to the destruction of enemy armed forces 
and the development of democratic governments that aligned with the Allies’ 
national interests.
Planning at the theater and operational levels of war had a significant impact 
on termination of the conflict in the Pacific on terms favorable to U.S. national 
interests. In essence, planning is where battlefield success begins. The overall 
strategic plan for the defeat of Japan was to advance westward and northwest-
ward, along two main axes of advance from the central and southwest Pacific, 
respectively, with the two campaigns conducted at a mutually supportive distance 
from each other. Campaign plans developed by the planning staffs of the two 
major theater commanders, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, employed 
U.S. forces in a series of logical steps toward the ultimate objective: the Japanese 
mainland. MacArthur’s forces in the Southwest Pacific Area would advance 
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northwest from New Guinea to the Philippine Islands, while Nimitz’s forces in the 
Pacific Ocean Areas would advance west through the Solomon, Gilbert, Marshall, 
and Mariana Islands before supporting MacArthur’s forces in the Philippines in 
October 1944. Both MacArthur’s MUSKETEER plans to seize the Philippines and 
Nimitz’s Campaign Plan GRANITE, which laid out the sequence of island-hopping 
assaults in the Pacific for 1944, illustrate the two theater commanders’ mastery 
of the application of operational art to achieve theater strategic objectives. By the 
end of 1944, the success of these two prongs would destroy the bulk of Japanese 
naval and air power, pushing Japan to the brink of defeat by the spring of 1945.
By mid-1943, when Nimitz’s forces still were fighting for control of the Solo-
mon Islands and MacArthur’s forces were continuing to fight in New Guinea, the 
U.S. Joint Staff planners had developed an accurate assessment of Japanese inten-
tions and capabilities that would be instrumental in planning for Japan’s defeat. In 
short, the Joint Staff knew that Japan’s ability to “establish undisputed control of 
an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific” and to be “self-sufficient economi-
cally” even then was slipping away. Japan was now on the strategic defensive, 
with any hopes for achieving victory resting on (perceived) Allied war weariness. 
American planners understood that Japan’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 
had become vulnerable to attack, and that “ultimately greatly superior forces can 
be directed against her.”8 
But even in mid-August 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff—the Allies’ stra-
tegic planning staff that oversaw all operations in the war—still had some differ-
ences of opinion with regard to how to end the conflict with Japan. Together they 
were optimistic that termination of the conflict in Europe would allow a “reori-
entation” of Allied forces to the Pacific.9 While agreeing that the overall strategy 
to defeat Japan required retaining China as an ally, destroying Japanese naval 
and air power, blockading Japan, and conducting large-scale strategic bombing 
of the homeland, American and British planners disagreed on the details. Britain 
thought the target date of defeating Japan one year after Germany was too opti-
mistic, and pushed for Nimitz’s central Pacific campaign to be the main effort, as 
opposed to the mutually supporting campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur that 
the U.S. Chiefs of Staff advocated.10 But these differences were worked out in 
short order—building a consensus in planning for the defeat of Japan that, while 
difficult to achieve, was a necessary condition for a lasting victory.
By the end of 1943, the United States and Britain had agreed on how best 
to defeat Japan. A Combined Chiefs of Staff report entitled “Overall Plan for 
the Defeat of Japan” laid out a clear strategy to achieve victory, and it drove all 
subsequent planning at the theater level of war. No longer disagreeing about 
whether the campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur had to be mutually support-
ing, but instead acknowledging that the central Pacific drive could result in “a 
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more rapid advance toward Japan and her vital lines of communication,” the 
United States and Britain agreed to conduct intensive bombing and to establish 
an air and sea blockade of Japan, thereby setting the conditions for an assault of 
the Japanese mainland, if necessary. The result would be the destruction of the 
Japanese fleet and air force, the isolation of Japan, and the conduct of carrier-
based attacks on the home islands. The two allies also agreed to take advantage 
of any Soviet intervention in the Pacific War. The planners still hedged their bets 
with regard to plans for future operations, stating that a major assault would take 
place in spring 1945 in the Formosa-Luzon-China area.11 Nonetheless, Nimitz’s 
Campaign Plan GRANITE was the clear result of the Combined Chiefs guidance, 
and the admiral and his staff sequenced all subsequent operations in the central 
Pacific (including in the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas) “to force the sur-
render of Japan.”12 
As U.S. operations throughout 1944 successfully swept up from the southwest 
Pacific and central Pacific, strategic planners wrestled with what should come 
next. The critical question was whether to seize Formosa or Luzon on the way to 
Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) believed that a key to the defeat of Japan lay 
in China; the United States planned to launch an “overwhelming air offensive” 
from bases there, and eventually to seize a port in China.13 Therefore, seizing 
Formosa was a strategic priority, because doing so would cut the SLOCs between 
Japan and its Southern Resource Area, provide a base from which to bomb Japan, 
and establish a supply route to China.14 
Differences of opinion between Nimitz and MacArthur over what would con-
tribute most to the defeat of Japan led to a meeting with President Roosevelt in 
July 1944 to resolve the issue. MacArthur argued decisively that Luzon offered 
the greater advantages, both militarily and politically, while Nimitz favored by-
passing Luzon for Formosa. Nimitz eventually would change his mind, after the 
Japanese seized coastal areas in China in September 1944. By December, the JCS 
directed MacArthur to assault Luzon and Nimitz to execute his planned assaults 
of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Interestingly, the JCS never officially terminated plan-
ning for Formosa; in the end, events simply would make the point moot.15 
Once the decision to strike at Luzon was made, the major question that re-
mained in the Pacific—which drove heated discussions through the spring of 
1945—was whether the United States could defeat Japan through blockade and 
bombardment or instead would have to conduct an actual massive assault on the 
industrial heartland of Japan. The joint planners still hedged their bets at the start 
of 1945; they believed an assault on Kyushu would help intensify the blockade 
and air bombardment of Japan, as well as set conditions for a follow-on assault 
on Honshu.16 The Joint Chiefs knew that difficult fighting remained and warned 
that such an invasion might have to wait until 1946. In fact, the British Chiefs of 
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Staff now feared that it would take up to two years after the defeat of Germany to 
force unconditional surrender on Japan.17 
The key to defeating Japan was to destroy Japanese military and economic 
power by advancing closer to the home islands incrementally. By the beginning 
of 1945, the United States had cut the critical SLOCs between Japan and the 
Southern Resource Area, established bases closer to Japan for follow-on op-
erations, and all but destroyed the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) as an effective 
fighting force. The series of campaigns and operations that seized decisive points 
throughout the southwest and central Pacific, through the Philippines, and to-
ward Japan itself had established the necessary conditions for a final assault on 
mainland Japan. The penultimate stage of the war included the seizure of Iwo 
Jima and Okinawa, two more decisive points along the main line of operations 
toward the ultimate objective. The capture of Iwo Jima gave the United States a 
forward air base at which to refuel B-29s from the Marianas and from which to 
provide fighter cover for the attacks on the main islands, as well as to act as a 
sanctuary at which damaged aircraft could make emergency landings.18 
Despite the plethora of military successes at the operational and theater levels 
in the Pacific, the United States still expected prolongation of the conflict. In 
May 1945, as Germany surrendered to the Allies only after a titanic battle in the 
streets of Berlin, the Joint Chiefs feared that Japan too would fight on at any cost 
to prevent the invasion of the home islands. They understood that “the prospect 
of the Emperor and the Imperial Family being in the hands of a foreign invader 
is repulsive and unthinkable to the Japanese.”19 Wary that the Japanese might sue 
for peace to prevent an actual occupation of Japan and fearful that the American 
public’s war weariness would lead to acceptance of such a conditional surrender 
in the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs reemphasized that their objective was uncondi-
tional surrender.20 
To compel Japan to surrender, the United States continued to conduct strikes 
and attacks throughout the summer of 1945, right up to the final moments of 
the war. Once Okinawa fell to U.S. forces in June 1945, continued bombing by 
the Strategic Air Force in the Marianas, the Tactical Air Force on Okinawa, and 
the Third Fleet intensified pressure on Japan. Strategic bombing, especially by B-
29s conducting incendiary and low-level attacks, devastated Japanese cities and 
industrial areas, killing thousands of civilians in the process. Offensive mining, 
conducted under the aptly named Operation STARVATION, continued to isolate 
Japan from its critical SLOCs.21 In addition, the blockade of Japan through the 
destruction of its merchant shipping and naval fleet by air attacks and submarines 
cut off Japan from essential imports such as oil, coal, and iron ore.22 
As the Japanese political and military leadership debated whether to terminate 
the country’s military operations, U.S. strategic air, carrier-based air, and surface 
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forces continued to pound targets on the main islands of Japan. On 10 August, 
Nimitz warned that “the public announcement by the Japanese of counter pro-
posals for the termination of the war must not be permitted to affect vigilance 
against Japanese attacks” and that “offensive action shall be continued unless 
otherwise specifically directed.”23 In addition, on 14 August, General Carl A. 
Spaatz’s Twentieth Air Force bombed northern Honshu with over eight hundred 
B-29s, from the Marianas. Even on 15 August, the day on which Japan formally 
announced its surrender, over a hundred aircraft from Admiral William F. Halsey 
Jr.’s Third Fleet carriers struck Japanese airfields on Honshu—minutes before 
Nimitz’s order to “suspend attack air operations” was received.24 
The United States also leveraged its “information instrument of power” to 
compel Japan to surrender. Information operations aimed to convince Japanese 
decision makers and the Japanese people that continued resistance was hopeless. 
From February 1945 through the end of the war, U.S. naval aircraft and B-29s 
dropped millions of leaflets on the home islands. With the objective of cracking 
Japanese morale and pressuring the people to petition the emperor, the leaflets 
eventually warned civilians that their cities would be destroyed by B-29 raids and 
informed them of the text of the Potsdam Declaration, the atomic bomb attacks, 
and Soviet entry into the war.25 
With U.S. forces occupying Okinawa and preparing for the final assault, Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki in ruins, and Soviet forces driving deep into Manchuria, 
Japan’s strategic leadership eventually decided that it could resist no longer. In the 
end Japan surrendered, even as 2.5 million combat-equipped troops prepared to 
defend against the American assault forces poised to seize Kyushu and Honshu. 
Thus, by August 1945 successful U.S. military operations finally had created 
sufficient political leverage to force Japanese decision makers (both civilian and 
military) to cease hostilities.
PLANNING FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION AND BEYOND:  
UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Thorough understanding of the operational environment played a key role in 
winning the war in the Pacific and would play a crucial role in winning the peace. 
Allied intelligence estimates, based on intercepts and decryption of Japanese 
diplomatic and military communications, allowed the United States to offset 
Japan’s advantages and exploit its weaknesses. In the final phase of the conflict 
in the Pacific, the United States developed a comprehensive picture of Japanese 
capabilities and intentions, which supported Allied plans for the final campaign 
against Kyushu and Honshu while simultaneously enlightening planners and 
decision makers regarding the primacy of the emperor to the nation of Japan. 
With this combination of a clear idea of how the Japanese military was preparing 
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to defend the mainland and the thinking of Japan’s national strategic leadership, 
the United States was able to conduct thorough planning for the final assault of 
Japan while concurrently developing termination criteria that not only suited its 
own national interests but also, eventually, appealed to the emperor and members 
of his inner circle.
In planning for conflict termination, the United States (and Britain) had de-
veloped a comprehensive assessment of the state of Japan’s military and political 
strengths and weaknesses. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had an accurate picture 
of Japan’s intent and capabilities that helped shape planning for the final cam-
paign of the war, as well as termination criteria that fell short of unconditional 
surrender. They correctly surmised that the Japanese equated unconditional sur-
render with “national extinction” and understood that the Japanese government 
in July 1945 wanted to “fight as long and as desperately as possible in the hope 
of avoiding complete defeat and of acquiring a better bargaining position in a 
negotiated peace.”26 
In addition, the U.S. State Department had formulated a plan to shape the 
termination debate and to establish a postwar occupation policy. Acting Secre-
tary of State Joseph C. Grew understood that preserving the institution of the 
emperor was an “irreducible” Japanese condition for surrender and that trying 
the emperor as a war criminal or abolishing the throne would lead to “prolonged 
resistance.”27 His counterpart in the War Department, Secretary of War Henry L. 
Stimson, agreed that if the United States acceded to maintaining a constitutional 
monarchy under the present emperor, then Japan would be much more likely to 
surrender.28 These powerful voices would help influence President Harry S. Tru-
man to accept conflict termination on terms short of unconditional surrender.
Planning the Final Assaults: OLYMPIC and CORONET
The campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur had set the conditions for the final 
assault on the main islands of Japan itself. The critical question that remained, 
however, was whether such an assault was necessary to compel Japan to surren-
der or the same objective could be achieved with fewer American casualties via 
blockade and continued bombing.
By April 1945, the Joint Chiefs had come to the conclusion that the invasion 
of Japan was a prerequisite to forcing unconditional surrender. They feared that 
bombardment and blockade could lead to a negotiated peace, and that only an 
assault on the Japanese home islands would force absolute surrender. They also 
questioned whether Japan ever actually would surrender and argued that the 
United States was compelled to bring about a “decisive military defeat.” The 
Joint Chiefs believed that only the military instrument of national power would 
achieve the ultimate objective of defeating Japan: “Unless a definition of uncon-
ditional surrender can be given which is acceptable to the Japanese, there is no 
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alternative to annihilation and no prospect that the threat of absolute defeat will 
bring about capitulation.”29 
Additional fighting would not be easy. The planned operations—OLYMPIC 
and CORONET—were given an end date of June 1946, under the overall cover 
name DOWNFALL.30 Casualty estimates were high for both sides; for Operation 
OLYMPIC alone, casualties for U.S. forces were projected to be 150,000–160,000, 
including upward of 38,000 killed in action, while Japan was expected to suffer 
upward of 250,000 combatants and 380,000 civilians killed.31
Yet clearly the Joint Chiefs had listened to General MacArthur, who believed 
firmly that invading Kyushu and Honshu would be necessary. In a communica-
tion to General George C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff, MacArthur recom-
mended an attack on Kyushu, to provide land-based air cover for the ultimate 
objective, “a decisive assault on Honshu.” Dismissing two other courses of action 
to force Japan’s surrender—continued bombardment and blockade—as being too 
time-consuming, MacArthur argued that the assaults on Kyushu and Honshu 
“would permit application of full power of our combined resources, ground, 
naval, and air, on the decisive objective.” In his estimation, the approach could 
force Japan to surrender earlier than anticipated. Amphibious assaults had been 
a staple of successful maritime warfare in MacArthur’s island-hopping campaigns 
in the Pacific throughout the war, and the general had no intention of dismissing 
the method that had been perfected over the preceding three years.32 
While MacArthur wholeheartedly supported an invasion of Japan, Nimitz 
advocated an alternate course of action. He saw great risk in a major assault on 
Kyushu and Honshu, for three reasons: Japan’s fighting capability in defensive 
warfare, the traditional Japanese refusal to surrender, and the use of suicide at-
tacks. Nimitz firmly believed that the defeat of Japan was inevitable and a direct 
assault rash. In a communication to Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in 
Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, Nimitz argued in April 1945 
that “unless speed is considered so important that we are willing to accept less 
than the best preparation and more than minimum casualties, I believe that the 
long range interests of the U.S. will be better served if we continue during 1945 
to isolate Japan and to destroy Jap[anese] forces and resources by naval and air 
attack.”33 Thus, the two U.S. theater commanders in the Pacific initially were at 
odds over how best to defeat Japan and bring the war to an end.
Soon, however, they would be coordinating their efforts in planning for the 
final assaults on Japan, because on 25 May the Joint Chiefs put an end to any re-
maining relevant discussion over the invasion of the Japanese home islands. They 
issued a planning directive to the theater commanders for the assault of Kyushu, 
Operation OLYMPIC, with a target date of 1 November 1945.34 The amphibi-
ous assault would be the largest in history and would be the first of two major 
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operations planned to seize Japan and force the enemy to surrender. American 
strategic leadership believed that success in these final operations would compel 
the Japanese to terminate the conflict and provide the United States with the 
utmost leverage to set conditions for long-term stability within the context of 
U.S. national interests. In a meeting with President Truman on 18 June, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, along with Stimson and Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal, were 
unanimous in their agreement that Operation OLYMPIC offered the best chance 
to defeat Japan once and for all.35 
Planning the Peace: BLACKLIST and CAMPUS
Although the Joint Chiefs had come to the conclusion that capturing the home 
islands likely was the only way to compel the Japanese to surrender, they also 
ensured that contingency plans were drawn up so they could be executed if the 
Japanese surrendered at any time. On 14 June 1945, the chiefs directed both 
Nimitz and MacArthur to plan for the “sudden collapse or surrender of Japan” to 
ensure that the United States could take advantage of such a situation with regard 
to the subsequent occupation.36 As a result, both theater commanders drafted 
contingency plans—CAMPUS and BLACKLIST—that could be executed on Japan’s 
surrender. Thus, while winning the war was difficult enough, now the United 
States also would plan to win the peace. Once again, employing the right force 
at the right time and place would be paramount in translating a military victory 
into long-term strategic success.
Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur synchronized their efforts in plan-
ning for the sudden surrender of Japan. By 3 August, just days before the sur-
render occurred, the two theater commanders had worked out all major issues.37 
Nimitz developed Operation CAMPUS to have three distinct phases: (1) the 
“emergency naval occupation of Tokyo Bay”; (2) the “complete deployment of 
naval occupation forces”; and (3) “amphibious operations connected with the 
occupation of Japan by U.S. Army forces.”38 CAMPUS became the naval compo-
nent of Operation BLACKLIST, detailing the naval and amphibious phases of the 
overall operation, focused on the rapid occupation of Tokyo Bay and other stra-
tegic areas as a prelude to the entry of U.S. Army forces. Its major tasks included 
conducting the amphibious phases of BLACKLIST and supporting the land phases 
of the occupation, maintaining the lines of communication to Japan, clearing 
minefields, ensuring the destruction or seizure of the remaining IJN fleet, and 
establishing naval and naval air facilities for follow-on operations.39 The plan also 
gave American occupation forces the authority to impose “drastic penalties” if 
they encountered Japanese noncompliance with U.S. postconflict directives. Pos-
sible sanctions and reprisals included the forced evacuation and destruction of 
communities, bombing, the destruction of property, and the taking of hostages.40
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MacArthur distributed the plan for Operation BLACKLIST on 8 August, one 
week before the Japanese surrender. The plan acted as a guide for “prompt action 
upon termination of organized resistance in the areas to be occupied,” including 
the control of Japanese military forces and civilians and the enforcement of the 
final terms of surrender.41 Overall, the plan consisted of a progressive occupation 
of fourteen areas in Japan (and some areas in Korea) that ensured American con-
trol of Japan’s instruments of national power. A key component of the plan was 
to use existing Japanese military and political organizations. This would reduce 
the number of U.S. forces required for occupation duty and allow for a degree of 
stability in the rebuilding process of Japan. Still, the plan called for the occupation 
of Japan with a total force of over seven hundred thousand U.S. forces. The initial 
focus of BLACKLIST would be to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including 
disarming Japanese forces immediately and establishing control over communi-
cations.42 BLACKLIST would go into effect immediately on Japan’s surrender.
The Atomic Bomb and Entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War
Two final factors—the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
and the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific War—exerted additional pressure on 
the Japanese government to surrender and emphasized the point that the United 
States was still seeking unlimited means to destroy Japan. There were, and would 
be, few, if any, restrictions on the means pursued and efforts wielded to achieve 
battlefield success in pursuit of political leverage to affect a postwar settlement.
Historians have written much about the atomic bomb being the decisive fac-
tor in forcing surrender, somewhat less assessing the overall impact of the Soviet 
intervention.43 However, the use of atomic bombs against Japanese cities and 
the Soviet invasion of Japanese-occupied territory were merely additional, and 
certainly not the only, factors in forcing the Japanese government to surrender. 
Asserting any such single or narrow explanation for Japan’s surrender ignores two 
critical contributions up to that point: the relentless push of offensive operations 
that already had driven Japan to the brink of military defeat, and a comprehensive 
understanding of the strategic and operational environments that had allowed 
the Allies to plan for war termination and to develop effective termination crite-
ria that would lead the Japanese to accede to surrendering. Although these issues 
still are debated hotly today, the fact that by 1945 the United States had reduced 
Japanese military strength significantly and had captured key island chains al-
ready had established the conditions in which these final two events took place.44 
The use of the bombs certainly stunned Japan’s strategic leadership, but mostly 
it reinforced the existing intentions of both the war and peace factions, respec-
tively to continue or terminate operations.45 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria 
on 9 August added to Japan’s desperate situation. Earlier in the war, the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had supported Soviet armed intervention against Japan, arguing 
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that “every effort should be made to bring the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan 
at the earliest practicable date.”46 After Germany surrendered, the Soviets had 
agreed at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 to launch an invasion of Japanese-
held territory. News of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria stunned Japan’s strategic 
leadership, but it too essentially reinforced the existing beliefs of both the war and 
peace factions that surrounded the emperor.47 
The confluence of ongoing U.S. operations, the use of the atomic bombs, and 
the Soviet invasion of Japanese territory emphasize the nearly unlimited nature 
of the war the Allies waged to gain political leverage. One final piece—American 
willingness to compromise on unconditional surrender—would give Japan’s stra-
tegic leadership an olive branch to grasp.
Potsdam and Conditional Surrender
One of the greatest challenges for American strategic leadership in the Pacific 
War was the transition from war to peace. At the end of a conflict characterized 
by its brutality, enormous cost in military and civilian lives, and racial overtones, 
how could the United States establish long-term stability in the region, to ensure 
that the achievement of the strategic objective of (almost) unconditional surren-
der would not be ephemeral? By developing and acting on a holistic understand-
ing of the operational environment—particularly the primacy to the Japanese 
people and leadership of the imperial family—the United States was able to ap-
peal to the peace faction and make inroads into the war faction, enabling it to end 
the conflict without conducting a bloody assault on the main islands.
The Potsdam Declaration, signed by the United States, Britain, and China on 
26 July 1945, made it clear to Japan that continued resistance would be met with 
a united military response. The Allies offered a simple but blunt choice: uncon-
ditional surrender or “prompt and utter destruction.” Continuation of the war 
therefore promised Japan a grim future. Unconditional surrender amounted to 
acceptance of the occupation of Japanese territory until Japan eliminated milita-
rism, disarmed its armed forces and industry, and accepted war crimes trials.48 
At this point, there was no specific mention of the fate of the emperor and the 
imperial system, but it soon became a key sticking point affecting the decision 
whether to terminate hostilities.
Although unconditional surrender had been the clear American objective for 
over two years, cracks in its foundation began to appear in 1945. The critical is-
sue that emerged within U.S. (as well as Japanese) strategic leadership circles in 
the waning days of the war was the role of the emperor in postwar Japan. In fact, 
short of conducting an all-out assault on the Japanese home islands, achieving a 
cessation of hostilities in the Pacific depended on it. There were two schools of 
thought in the United States; those who favored keeping the emperor included 
Secretary of War Stimson, Under Secretary of State Grew, and Chief of Staff to the 
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Commander in Chief Admiral William D. Leahy, while those who advocated his 
removal included Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Assistant Secretary of State 
Dean G. Acheson, and former Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
The first group argued that failure to preserve the emperor would prolong 
the war—in particular, that Japanese forces would recognize only the author-
ity of the emperor with regard to surrender. As early as 1943 Grew had argued 
that after the war the Japanese throne could “serve as a cornerstone for healthy 
and peaceful internal growth.”49 He believed that maintaining the emperor 
could hasten Japan’s surrender without the need for a bloody assault on the 
home islands.50 Stimson agreed that if the United States proposed maintaining 
“a constitutional monarchy” under the present emperor, then Japan would be 
much more likely to surrender.51 Leahy, who as military adviser to the president 
had considerable influence on this question, warned President Truman that 
insistence on unconditional surrender would lead to Japanese desperation and 
increased U.S. casualties.52 
The second school of thought believed that keeping the emperor—the symbol 
of Japanese militarism—would encourage the militarists and thereby prolong the 
war, as well as create political problems back in America. Hull considered that 
anything short of unconditional surrender was “appeasement,” while Byrnes ar-
gued that the United States must set the terms of surrender.53 In addition, “uncon-
ditional surrender” was a powerful motto back home; the majority of Americans 
supported it and saw the emperor as a war criminal.54 
In the end, conditional surrender won the day. Sizable Japanese forces still 
waited in the home islands and others were scattered across China, Southeast 
Asia, and the Netherlands East Indies. Allied civilian and military leaders under-
stood the critical importance of the emperor as the figure who could order the 
surrender of fighters who otherwise would be willing to carry on to the death.
Navy Secretary Forrestal’s proposal to keep the emperor in place but follow 
the intents and purposes of the Potsdam Declaration provided a way out for 
both combatants. On 10 August, Japan finally agreed to accept the Potsdam 
Declaration, with the added condition of preserving the emperor. The following 
day, Secretary of State Byrnes sent a reply through official channels in which the 
Allies insisted that the authority of the emperor be subject to the authority of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (General MacArthur).55 In this way 
an uneasy, and rather vague, compromise to unconditional surrender was worked 
out. President Truman feared domestic political backlash but agreed to the com-
promise, stating simply: “They wanted to keep the Emperor. We told ’em we’d tell 
’em how to keep him, but we’d make the terms.”56 Despite contentious debates 
within American and Japanese strategic leadership circles, the former combatants 
had found an acceptable solution to end the war in the Pacific.
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THE EMPEROR AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE PEACE FACTION
History is rife with instances in which a combatant facing certain defeat contin-
ued to fight on long after there was any chance of achieving his or its objectives. 
This is particularly true when a nation is confronted with an existential threat to 
its way of life.
Yet political leverage still can exert a significant influence on conflict termina-
tion—even when wielded by the vanquished. The acquisition and retention of 
political leverage was a primary factor that drove Japanese planning for the final 
defense of the mainland. The concept was no different from plans Japan had 
made and executed the previous year, when Japanese forces fought to the death 
on the battlefield in pursuit of a negotiated settlement to the conflict. By forcing 
an unprecedented bloodletting on American forces, and at the cost of the lives 
of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens, Japan sought to exact concessions 
from the United States to achieve a postwar settlement that fell short of uncon-
ditional surrender. The importance of maintaining the emperor became the pri-
mary factor that brought the Japanese to a willingness to terminate the conflict.
Faction versus Faction
Once the tide of war turned against the Japanese, political factions emerged in 
Japan that would help shape its surrender. Throughout the war the Imperial 
Japanese Army (IJA) and the IJN held divergent views on the direction of the 
war, and achieving any reconciliation between them or any compromise on how 
to terminate the conflict proved as challenging as ever. Hostility between the two 
services was nothing new in Japan, as it had existed in the years leading up to 
outbreak of the war. Now, with the military situation leaving Japan in dire straits, 
the split between the views of the two political factions, including between the 
services, created difficulties for the emperor. The ministry of the IJN’s Security 
Research Division averred that “the present state is confrontation. The country 
must become one.”57 
As early as September 1943, former premiers (known as jushin [principal sub-
jects]) advocated seeking a peace settlement on favorable terms. They wanted to 
replace Premier Hideki Tōjō, an IJA hawk, with a more moderate premier. When 
Tōjō resigned in July 1944 after the devastating loss of Saipan, the jushin selected 
retired general Kuniaki Koiso and retired admiral Mitsumasa Yonai to lead the 
government (Koiso became premier). However, the Koiso cabinet’s stance re-
mained one of “all-out prosecution of the war” because Koiso believed that only 
a military success could improve Japan’s power to negotiate an end to the war on 
more-favorable terms.58 Thus, Japan too believed that achieving battlefield suc-
cess was a prerequisite for exerting political leverage.
By January 1945, with the United States in control of Saipan and the Philip-
pines, the emperor had expressed concern that Japan’s hopes for victory were 
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fading fast. At that point, however, the emperor was in favor of continuing the war, 
and he approved a directive to defend the homeland against invasion in “the final 
decisive battle of the war.”59 But when he met in February with members of the 
jushin to hear their views on Japan’s situation at the time, the emperor discovered 
that some favored peace, with former prime minister Fumimaro Konoe going 
so far as to advise the emperor to “end the war as soon as possible.”60 Continued 
defeat on the battlefield combined with diplomatic setbacks (e.g., the breakdown 
of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact) forced the resignation of Koiso in spring 
1945. Members of the peace faction, however, faced a conundrum. They had to se-
lect as a replacement someone who advocated peace yet also would be acceptable 
to the hawks. Admiral Kantarō Suzuki became the clear choice, and his cabinet, 
consisting of General Korechika Anami as war minister, Admiral Yonai as navy 
minister, and Mr. Shigenori Tōgō as foreign minister, would govern from 7 April 
1945 through the final surrender.61 
Upon taking over, Suzuki believed that the emperor wished to reach a settle-
ment of the war, but the new premier advocated continued hostilities until the 
moment was right for a negotiated settlement. This decision also would help keep 
his cabinet intact.62 So even as U.S. forces assaulted Okinawa and B-29s continued 
to pound Japan’s cities, Japan’s strategic leadership had split into two diametrically 
opposed factions, and the factors that prevented conflict termination in Japan—
insistence on preserving the emperor, the desire to save face, and fear of a coup—
remained dominant.63 
Even as U.S. forces captured Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, Japan’s strategic 
leadership sought to protect its diminished gains by continuing to fight so as to 
reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict. In June 1945, despite overwhelm-
ingly negative reports from the battlefield, a deteriorating diplomatic effort 
regarding the possibility of Soviet mediation, and indications of Soviet troop 
movements toward Japanese-occupied Manchuria, the official policy of the 
Supreme Council for the Direction of the War on 8 June was “to prosecute the 
war to the end in order to preserve the national polity and protect the Imperial 
Homeland.”64 The military was in the midst of planning the KETSU-GO opera-
tion—the final decisive battle to annihilate any Americans who attempted to in-
vade mainland Japan—so as to obtain political leverage for a negotiated settle-
ment.65 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of Japan Kōichi Kido, a key advocate of the 
peace faction, now conducted a last-ditch effort to appeal directly to the emperor. 
He aimed to achieve “an honorable peace” with his “Draft Plan of Countermea-
sures to Meet the Situation,” which warned of the inevitability of mass civilian 
casualties from Allied bombing and worsening starvation with the coming of 
winter. At this point, the emperor was moved by Kido’s plan, favoring diplomatic 
efforts over a decisive battle.66 However, the opposition faction, composed of 
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War Minister Anami and the chiefs of the army and navy, believed Japan could 
secure more-favorable conditions if their services defended the mainland against 
invasion and inflicted heavy casualties on U.S. forces.67 In short, political leverage 
could be bought at the cost of thousands of American and hundreds of thousands 
of Japanese lives.
The release of the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July had a polarizing effect on 
the two major political factions. The doves feared that rejecting the terms would 
lead to serious consequences, while the hawks considered acceptance tantamount 
to unconditional surrender. This divided stance led to maintaining the status 
quo in terms of continuing hostilities while clinging to the false hope of either 
a breakthrough in the pursuit of Soviet mediation or a military success that 
forced the United States to negotiate. So at this point Japan rejected the Potsdam 
Declaration. Prime Minister Suzuki claimed that Japan simply would ignore it.68 
However, after reports of the devastation of Hiroshima reached Tokyo on the 
afternoon of 6 August, Foreign Affairs Minister Tōgō again urged acceptance of 
the declaration. The emperor finally agreed that Japan no longer could delay the 
decision to terminate the conflict.69
The dropping of the second bomb, on Nagasaki, and the Soviet invasion of 
Manchuria and northern Japan exposed once again the deep divisions within 
Japan’s strategic leadership. Even as the doves argued that continuing the conflict 
would lead to the ultimate extinction of the nation itself, the hawks continued 
to counter that once severe casualties had been inflicted on the expected inva-
sion force favorable terms still would be possible. Eventually the combined effect 
of recent events proved to be too much for the emperor, however, and he met 
with the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War on 10 August—a day of 
reckoning. Tōgō pushed for acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, with one 
condition: “the defense of the Constitution.” Yonai, the minister of the navy, and 
Kiichirō Hiranuma, lord president of the council, supported him. On the other 
hand, Anami, the minister of the army, demanded a number of conditions: (1) 
the Japanese, and not the Allies, would disarm all overseas Japanese forces; (2) 
only the Japanese government itself could prosecute war criminals; and (3) the 
Allies would not occupy Japan. Despite the fact that insisting on these conditions 
would mean continuation of the war, General Yoshijirō Umezu, the chief of the 
army general staff, and Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the chief of the naval general 
staff, supported the position.70 
The one issue on which both factions unanimously agreed was the necessity 
to maintain the emperor, in victory or defeat. The emperor was a sacred figure 
in Japan, and his wishes were a decisive influence over policy. Finally, at this des-
perate hour, the emperor forced an uneasy reconciliation of the factions, stating 
as follows: “I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and 
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abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction 
for the nation.”71 Consequently, at 0400 on 10 August, the Supreme Council for 
the Direction of the War agreed to accept the Potsdam Declaration—with the 
caveat that the emperor remain as sovereign ruler. Although the political factions 
continued to argue over interpretations of Byrnes’s note, which left the emperor 
on the throne but under the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers, they sensed a coup d’état looming, so they resorted to a final conference 
with the emperor on 14 August. An emotional emperor reiterated his stance 
that “it is pointless to continue the war any longer.”72 He finally had broken the 
deadlock. The ultimate decision to surrender was sent through official channels 
to the Allies, who accepted promptly, and an imperial rescript was broadcast to 
the people the next day.73 U.S. strategic leadership thereby had compromised on 
unconditional surrender, accepting the continuation of the emperor but under 
the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
The decisions of the emperor to intervene to break the deadlock in the council 
over the direction of the war and to broadcast his resultant surrender decision to 
the people of Japan were key components of the successful conflict termination. 
Those actions, combined with an additional imperial rescript on 2 September 
that directed the people to comply with the surrender demands, showed that 
the emperor had embraced peace, belatedly but assuredly.74 Given the emperor’s 
sacred position and authority in Japan, the imperial rescripts exerted a tremen-
dous influence, leading to a successful transition to peace throughout Japanese-
occupied territories and in the home islands.
A Key Advocate for Conflict Termination: Rear Admiral Sōkichi Takagi
To understand the emperor’s final decision to capitulate, it is necessary to ex-
amine the role of Rear Admiral Sōkichi Takagi, IJN. This respected naval officer 
wielded a decisive influence within the peace faction.
Takagi’s relationship with the Kyoto school was the source of a critical portion 
of that influence. The Kyoto school was a philosophical and interdisciplinary 
movement centered at Kyoto University that assimilated Western philosophy and 
religious beliefs with Japanese philosophy and religious beliefs; in particular, it 
embraced a synthesis of the Eastern philosophy of religion with Western scien-
tific culture. From early on the Kyoto school had criticized the entire idea of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as constituting an empty motto, believing 
it was impossible to establish cooperation in the occupied areas.75 
Takagi’s role in ending the war began in earnest in 1943. Shortly after his pro-
motion to rear admiral, Takagi received a secret order from Shigeyoshi Inoue, 
undersecretary of the IJN, tasking him with assessing the true situation in the 
Pacific War. By 1944, Takagi was engaged actively in determining how best to ter-
minate the war, by providing key influence and support to IJN minister Yonai.76 
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At the end of August 1944, Takagi resigned his post as Bureau Chief of Military 
Education at the Navy Ministry, having been ordered secretly by Minister Yonai 
and Vice-Minister Inoue to inquire into possible ways to terminate the war. To 
that end, he frequently moved among senior statesmen, IJA and IJN officers, and 
imperial family members to collect information and coordinate actions. After 
months of research, in May 1945 Takagi developed a proposal based on the rap-
idly deteriorating military situation. The report included the idea of conducting 
peace negotiations via Soviet mediation, with the intent of terminating the con-
flict prior to any possibility of a decisive battle on the Japanese mainland. Takagi 
then worked to influence the positions of the emperor and additional IJN offi-
cers.77 However, when the Suzuki cabinet held its first imperial conference on 8 
June, it decided once again in favor of a decisive battle on the mainland, intended 
to exact concessions from the United States.78 
With the IJA intent on continuing the conflict to the bitter end, regardless of 
military and civilian losses, Takagi emerged as an influential moderate. Holding 
frequent discussions with adherents of the Kyoto school, Takagi helped provide 
the IJN with a voice of reason. The relationship between the IJN and the Kyoto 
school produced a combination that emerged as “the only power [that could] 
control the reckless war expansion of the IJA.”79 Discussions among members 
of the Kyoto school and Takagi focused on analysis of the historical background 
of the war, the current domestic and foreign situations, possible modifications 
to the national war strategy and policy, and the prospects for ceasing hostilities. 
With Takagi reaching out to the Kyoto school to produce a body of ideas that 
could help terminate the conflict in the Pacific, the IJN eventually was able to 
help modify the war policy of the emperor and the imperial faction that up to that 
point had advocated the extreme-right nationalism tied to the IJA.
As the Japanese political and military leadership debated how the war in the 
Pacific should end, Takagi worked hard to influence key decision makers to ter-
minate the conflict and prevent additional devastation and bloodshed. He was 
not afraid to speak his mind and assess Japan’s situation in objective terms. To 
counter the IJA’s desire to carry on the fight, Takagi continued to urge the em-
peror to terminate the war.80 He criticized the IJA for “madly proclaiming that the 
time had come to stage a great decisive battle on the homeland that would defeat 
the enemy.”81 Takagi continued this work to enlighten other members of the Japa-
nese military and political leadership right up to the end of the war, contributing 
his objective assessments to the emperor’s cabinet when Japan was in the throes 
of uncertainty and desperation about what lay ahead. He fully understood the 
difficulty of terminating a conflict that many in Japan had believed was certain 
to end in victory. Takagi commented that “there were few people who knew the 
hardship of the front that was near to the IJA and the IJN, the internal conditions 
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and destruction; the government and supreme command were desperate, al-
though we hid the truth.”82 
Takagi, however, was a realist, and he emerged as a critical influence over the 
emperor in the final phase of the war in the Pacific. By August 1945, Takagi had 
become an instrumental figure as the “master of war termination,” advocating 
behind the scenes for an unpopular position: convincing the emperor and key 
cabinet members to seek an end to the war.83 Eventually his efforts helped sway 
the emperor to make a decision amid a factious cabinet. In the end the emperor 
took the position that Takagi and the peace faction supported.
Takagi, along with the intellectuals of the Kyoto school, was able to influence 
the IJN in the final phase of the Pacific War, giving the peace faction within the 
emperor’s cabinet an accurate assessment of Japan’s true situation. Together they 
provided Japan’s strategic leadership with sound military advice that took into 
consideration the impact that continued military operations would have on the 
civilian population. More importantly, they helped shape the emperor’s evolution 
from war to peace.
The surrender ceremony, held on the deck of the Third Fleet flagship USS Mis-
souri, was a solemn affair—punctuated by a clear message to the political leader-
ship, armed forces, and people of Japan. During the signing of the Instrument 
of Surrender, the United States and its allies demonstrated, in the air and on the 
sea, their enormous military power. Hundreds of U.S. Army and Navy planes 
flew overhead, while over 250 ships from the United States, Britain, Australia, 
and New Zealand filled the expanse of Tokyo Bay.84 There would be no way for a 
“stab in the back” myth to arise in Japan; a massive armada had come to the very 
doorstep of the Japanese mainland to emphasize the vast military power that had 
defeated Japan and that could be called on again if Japan did not comply with the 
Instrument of Surrender. Five days later, General MacArthur arrived in Tokyo 
and raised above the U.S. embassy the American flag—in fact, the very same flag 
that had flown over Washington, DC, on 7 December 1941 and on the battleship 
Missouri during the surrender.85 
The American victory over Japan was complete. Not only did Japan agree 
to terminate its military operations and disarm, but it also pledged to work in 
good faith with U.S. forces in the occupation and rebuilding of Japan. In sign-
ing the Instrument of Surrender, Japan agreed to the unconditional surrender 
of all military forces and to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The emperor 
would remain in power—under the Supreme Commander for the Allied Pow-
ers. In essence, the arrangements constituted an unconditional surrender for the 
military but a conditional surrender for the nation. Setting the conditions for a 
peaceful occupation, Japan also agreed “to obey and enforce all proclamations” 
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of the supreme commander (MacArthur) and “to carry out the provisions of the 
Potsdam Declaration in good faith.”86 
The transition to a peacetime occupation proceeded remarkably free of con-
flict. Although U.S. occupation forces were given the authority to impose severe 
penalties in cases of Japanese noncompliance with occupation directives, the 
words of the emperor had allowed the Japanese to absorb their shocking defeat 
and begin to work with their former enemy to rebuild their nation. The United 
States, however, took no chances. Third Fleet forces, anchored in Tokyo Bay and 
the Sagami Sea, trained their big guns on targets ashore, while the initial airborne 
and amphibious landing forces on 30 August were equipped with full combat 
equipment.87 Despite a last-ditch coup d’état attempt by a few hard-line IJA offi-
cers who refused to accept the emperor’s surrender proclamation, Japanese army 
commanders took steps to surrender their sizable forces in Japan and throughout 
its overseas empire. General MacArthur was impressed with the level of com-
pliance, reporting that the Japanese in general were “acting in complete good 
faith.”88 This level of compliance would last throughout the seven-year period of 
occupation. Leaving the emperor on the throne, despite an outcry in the United 
States demanding his removal and punishment, was a critical decision that led to 
the relatively smooth transition to peace.
Conflict termination in the Pacific in World War II occurred despite the fact 
that each of the combatants was willing and able to carry on the fight into 1946. 
Driven by their different strategic objectives—unconditional surrender and a 
negotiated settlement—each side sought to translate military action into politi-
cal success, trading lives for political leverage in the postwar period. The United 
States was ready to conduct a final campaign to seize and occupy the home is-
lands, while the Japanese planned to incur (and suffer) unprecedented casualties 
to force the United States to negotiate a peace short of unconditional surrender. 
Fortunately, the strategic leadership on each side was open to compromise. Com-
prehensive understanding of the operational environment allowed the United 
States to set the conditions for termination and to understand and appreciate the 
importance of the emperor’s continued authority, while the emperor himself un-
derstood Japan’s desperate situation and ultimately embraced the peace faction’s 
willingness to end the fighting.
Compelling Japan to surrender without an Allied invasion of the mainland 
prevented tremendous destruction and the unnecessary loss of countless lives. 
This represented the epitome of political leverage borne by success on the 
battlefield. Postwar analysis by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded the 
following: “Japan’s acceptance of defeat without invasion while still possessed of 
2.5 million combat-equipped troops and 9,000 Kamikaze airplanes in the home 
islands, reveals how persuasively the consequences of [U.S.] operations were 
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translated into political results.”89 With clear strategic and operational objectives, 
U.S. planners had devised and conducted a series of campaigns and operations in 
a logical sequence that brought U.S. military forces closer and closer to Japan. By 
1945, with U.S. forces poised at the doorstep of the Japanese mainland, the United 
States had set the conditions for terminating the conflict, while the dropping of 
the atomic bombs and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria provided the final push 
to capitulation.
Throughout much of the war, the United States had a clear picture of Japanese 
capabilities and intentions, and this thorough understanding of the operational 
environment helped shape detailed planning and the development of termination 
criteria. With U.S. forces preparing for the final assault on the home islands that 
would compel the Japanese to surrender at great cost, key strategic leaders, such 
as Stimson and Grew, understood that unconditional surrender, especially the 
elimination of the emperor, confronted Japan with an existential threat to its way 
of life that would prolong the conflict. This understanding of the primacy of the 
emperor to the nation of Japan allowed President Truman ultimately to embrace 
the idea of a conditional surrender, at least to the extent of maintaining the em-
peror under the authority of MacArthur. This compromise appealed sufficiently 
to the emperor and his inner circle for them to accept it.
The ultimate factor leading to the termination of hostilities in August 1945 
was the emperor and his decision to embrace the peace faction in Japan. Under 
the keen influence of Rear Admiral Takagi, a key segment of Japan’s political and 
naval leadership pushed for termination to avoid additional bloodshed and save 
the mainland from certain destruction. Despite the splitting of his inner circle 
into two camps, the emperor finally made the decision to terminate Japanese 
military operations when it became clear that continued resistance offered far 
more risk to the nation than the possible reaction from hard-liners in the IJA. In 
doing so, he accepted the weakening of his authority in postwar Japan under U.S. 
leadership, but set the conditions for a successful transition to a peaceful occupa-
tion and the rebuilding of his nation.
The thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen who died thou-
sands of miles from home, as well as the hundreds of thousands of Japanese 
soldiers, sailors, and civilians who perished right through the waning minutes of 
the war, are testament to the unprecedented destruction resulting from a global 
conflict that often did not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. 
Only relentless operations and careful U.S. planning that resulted from a thor-
ough understanding of the operational environment finally pushed key Japanese 
civilian and military leaders to terminate the conflict on terms they once had 
considered unimaginable. In the end, each side was just flexible enough to seek 
a compromise, modifying their strategic objectives to set conditions for a better 
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future. In doing so, hundreds of thousands of lives were spared. The occupation 
of Japan began immediately, and Japan slowly began to rebuild from the ashes 
of war. More importantly, the United States and Japan would develop a last-
ing relationship that has been a foundation of stability in the Pacific for almost 
seventy-five years.
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